Recent Responses
Despite all the modern protestations of liberalism and political correctness, I have yet to meet a straight person who is fully comfortable with the idea of homosexuality. They claim to have no problem with the lifestyle, but inevitably succumb to negative gay stereotypes or latent discomfort (people are, I find, generally more accepting of me as a lesbian, but admit that they find the idea of gay men bizarre/wrong/funny etc). The increasing number of "out" gays seems only to have had an effect on the legal system, rather than people's general morality (and I do speak generally, from personal and first-hand experience alone). Why is it that the lessening gap between percentages of gay and straight people is not accompanied by similarly decreased prejudice? Imagine that the number of gay people outnumbered the straight population (unlikely, but I maintain that all humans are essentially bisexual) - would the minority straight population still see the gay population as "abnormal" due to the fact that they can't procreate - and are therefore "not natural"? And is this in some way linked to religious belief? Thank you.
Richard Heck
October 11, 2007
(changed October 11, 2007)
Permalink
I'm not sure what the philosophical question is here. I suppose it may be true that the questioner hasn't met "a straight person who is fully comfortable with the idea of homosexuality". I'm not really in a position to say. But maybe she should get out more. (Or visit my church.) Or maybe he... Read more
Suppose a woman decided, for whatever reason, to put a pregnancy 'on hold' indefinitely, even for the rest of her life, while the fetus was at a stage of development in which it is currently permissible to abort it. That is, the woman takes a potion and stays pregnant, but the fetus remains insider her and dependent on her, and it never develops any further than it already has. I think many people would find this morally problematic in ways in which they don't find abortion problematic. But where is the moral difference?
Richard Heck
October 11, 2007
(changed October 11, 2007)
Permalink
For what it's worth, I find it obscure why someone would wish to pursue this course of action, but I don't find it obviously to be morally objectionable in any way I don't find abortion morally objectionable.
Suppose the woman instead removed the fetus without its being killed, and put it in... Read more
For giving the students a good picture of a branch of philosophy are classic authors' text, specially very hard ones, replaceable by secondary literature or not?
Andrew N. Carpenter
December 12, 2007
(changed December 12, 2007)
Permalink
My experience is that manybeginning students can learn and grow a lot by engaging intensively with primary texts. This engagement is difficult for students and their instructors, but when it occurs it is extremely intellectually rewarding.
One of my earliest memories of a student wa... Read more
I never loved my wife, but I married her. We have a child. I’ve been in Love with another woman for the past year, but now I’m moving soon and will lose her. Would it be wrong to have an affair? Doesn’t Love, by nature irrational, transcend my duty to my wife? What is right: to be true to my promise of fidelity, or to be true to myself, my heart, to love? I want to be an authentic person. Recently I read Soren Kierkegaard’s telling of Abraham sacrificing Isaac in his _Fear and Trembling_. He demonstrates that confrontation with the religious can, and often does, go beyond the ethical, the rational. All I know is that it feels right with this other woman, and time is short. It's not just about sex, I love her soul. I don’t know where it will lead. Is adultery always wrong?
Allen Stairs
October 10, 2007
(changed October 10, 2007)
Permalink
You ask: "Doesn't love, by nature irrational, transcend my duty to my wife?" I answer: "Huh?"
You say you want to be an authentic person. I'd suggest that reading Fear and Trembling as a source of rationalizations for infidelity isn't a good recipe for authenticity. I'd also suggest that be... Read more
At the moment, I'm particularly concerned about the 'personal heresy' in philosophy. Recently, Thabo Mbeki, the South African president, gave a speech in which he quoted several racist statements by key philosophers of Western civilisation. David Hume, for instance believed that "of all the 'breeds' of man, the darkest breed was inferior.."(quote from Mbeki's speech) and it's also believed that Kant believed black people were 'beasts'(again, Mbeki's belief). Whether these quotes are accurate or not, it's indubitable that the milieu in which these philosophers formed their various normative frameworks was a deeply prejudiced one. If philosophy proceeds from deductivism, i.e a set of axioms are laid out, rules of inference determined, and from these various judgements made, is it possible that inherent within western thought is a kind of racial prejudice? And if so, is it possible to account for it, using some kind of 'personal equation' of the kind invoked by Gauss in his work with astronomy?
Allen Stairs
October 10, 2007
(changed October 10, 2007)
Permalink
I'll have to leave the bit about Gauss aside. All I know about the "personal equation" was that astronomers had noticed certain sorts of systematic variations among observers. But there was a different theme in your question that I'd like to address.
A preamble: Yes, Hume, Kant and other we... Read more
Can sentences refer to themselves? Take the "Liar" paradox: (1) This sentence is false. Does "This" really refer to the sentence I've labeled as (1)? Can sentences predicate properties to themselves in this way?
Daniel J. Velleman
October 9, 2007
(changed October 9, 2007)
Permalink
Your sentence (1) is often given as an example of a paradoxical sentence. The paradox arises from interpreting the phrase "this sentence" as referring to sentence (1) itself. If the sentence is true, then what it says is incorrect, so it is false. But if it is false, then what it says... Read more
I teach Philosophy of Law to Law students in Brazil, a discipline that lasts no longer than one semester and does not count on the students' previous affinity, and I am always wondering about the best way of investing the short time I have. I'm an enthusiast of the analytical tradition and its way of approaching the problems of the field. May you give me some advices or tips? For example: Which units are better: subjects, problems, schools, authors, theories? Which model is better: cases and problems, or authors and theories? What is more important: learning a little on many subjects (authors, theories etc.) or learning more on one or two subjects (authors, theories etc.)? Is the direct reading of the authors' texts indispensable or is it replaceable by good introductions and commentaries? Should I spend some time with the history of the discipline, or only with the present debates? I know I asked too many questions, I know a lot of the answers depends on my options and preferences, I know that almost every option is worthy somehow but I'm really interested in your answers, even if personal and contextualized.
Thomas Pogge
October 7, 2007
(changed October 7, 2007)
Permalink
More than on your preferences, the answers also depend on the kind of students you face and on the legal system within which they serve. In light of my limited knowledge of these and other relevant matters, I would suggest you focus on leading your students to think philosophically about the l... Read more
Is Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" still valuable in any philosophical and non-historical sense to think about knowledge and its conditions of possibility? André C.
Thomas Pogge
October 7, 2007
(changed October 7, 2007)
Permalink
As with other great works in the history of philosophy, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason -- the single greatest work of philosophy ever written, in my view -- is valuable more for the questions it poses and the ways it develops for pursuing these questions than for the answers. These questions a... Read more
Is it emotionally difficult to be a professional philosopher? Sometimes philosophical questions and subject matter seem so disturbing and intense, that it must surely be taxing psychologically. Does non-philosophical subject matter become pale and boring in comparison? Are professional philosophers socially isolated because of boredom with the non-philosophical, concomitant with the disturbing nature of the philosophical (so that it may not be acceptable in non-philosophical company)? Thanks.
Douglas Burnham
October 7, 2007
(changed October 7, 2007)
Permalink
I'd like to add a comment to Allen Stairs' excellent answer: it is worth distinguishing between philosophers who write about 'angst', and the experience of angst. In existentialism, for example, the experience of anxiety is often considered to be philosophically interesting (the fact that a... Read more
I am a freshman in college, and I am studying liberal studies to become an elementary school teacher. Do you think that to be a good elementary school teacher, philosophy is an important subject to study?
Douglas Burnham
October 7, 2007
(changed October 7, 2007)
Permalink
Yes and no, I'd say. Let us assume that two of the things that makes a good elementary school teacher are (i) encouraging thinking and asking questions about why things (including the pupils themselves) are the way they are, and (ii) encouraging a certain playfulness with concepts (seeing... Read more