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In a review of two of Martha Nussbaum's books, the reviewer mentions how, during a meeting of the American Philosophical Association, hotel housekeepers were apparently overheard saying that (and I quote) philosophers, in comparison to other academics, "don’t screw very much, but they sure do drink a lot." I wonder, then - is there a particular kind of temperament that is unusually common among philosophers? Do philosophers tend more towards melancholia (as I assume the notion of drinking implies), and if so, why? What are your experiences in this regard?
Richard Heck
May 10, 2012
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It does seem a bit unwise to base too much speculation on the reported remarks of a couple of hotel staff. Not that I mean to question their veracity or intelligence!
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Okay, this is an odd question probably but something about interacting with a dog makes me feel strange and kind of awkward. There is a consensus that dogs aren't conscious in the way humans are because they don't have "self-consciousness" or at least that is what people believe. So when I am around a dog I am thinking why should I even pet this dog? The dogs seems to want me to pet him/her presumably because they want affection but is that motive even possible if they don't have self-consciousness? In human interactions affection has a subject-predicate relational structure of I- (like,want,love,want to touch)- you and you couldn't conceive of affection without some idea of at least two separate and self-aware selves. So maybe it is the same for dogs? Maybe the whole idea that animals such as dogs lack self-consciousness is disproved by the mere fact that they want you to pet them? But it is awkward because I feel like I'm around a being that society and general consensus says shouldn't be granted the dignity of being that has self-consciousness but that very being seems to want to interact with me in a way that implies that very self-consciousness. Maybe there is also something uncomfortable about having the same worth and dignity as an animal when as humans we try so hard to prove our worth through our intellect- that is probably also part of what makes me feel awkward around dogs.
Richard Heck
May 10, 2012
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This is an interesting question. It's related, in a way, to a famous objection to Descartes's "I think, therefore I am". The objection was: What's with the I? Why not just: Some thinking is happening? So maybe the dog can be thinking: Petting would be good. Eating is good. Baths are bad! Frisbee is... Read more
Is "understanding" a proposition necessary, but not sufficient, for "believing" that same proposition? Further, where could one find arguments (discussion) for and/or against either position?
Stephen Maitzen
May 10, 2012
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I confess I'm puzzled by Prof. Heck's reply. He defends the following three assumptions:
(1) If you understand a proposition, then you also understand its negation.(2) It is necessary, if you are to believe a proposition, to understand it.(3) It's perfectly possible to believe a proposition and n... Read more
What's the philosophical response to Nietzsche's contention that all morality is merely a trick that the weak play upon the strong to get the strong to rein in their strength?
Douglas Burnham
May 25, 2012
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Nietzsche's analysis of the 'genealogy' of cultural forms (ofwhich moral ideas is the most obvious) is directed not to the past,but to the future. That is, what is key is what happens to subsequenthuman beings because of that origin. So, the fact that moralityoriginated in a lie, a misunderstandi... Read more
Is killing considered wrong because people have a right to be alive, or because the act of killing someone is immoral?
Charles Taliaferro
May 10, 2012
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Good question. Some ethical systems have grounded the ethics against homicide on grounds that do not appeal to the right to life. For example, some divine command theories hold that you should not kill innocent persons because this is prohibited by God. And some utilitarians (Bentham) repud... Read more
Hi, I have chosen to write an essay about kant's moral argument for the existence of God and evaluate his contribution to philosophy of religion as an option. However, I am not getting much help. What must I read to cover in the essay and how much of Kant's philosophy must I be familiar with? Thank you for your help in advance. Greta.
Charles Taliaferro
May 10, 2012
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Good wishes! I believe you can address Kant's moral argument without having to know a great deal of Kant's views in, say, The Critique of Pure Reason or Critique of Judgement. You could instead focus on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason. You can find a good discussion of the argument in t... Read more
If a person has a multiple personality disorder, are they one individual, or several individuals?
Jonathan Westphal
May 10, 2012
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What used to be called multiple personality disorder (MPD) is now called dissociative identity disorder (DID) in DSM, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, and the change in terminology may reflect a possible change in thinking. A personality (e.g. a television personality)... Read more
Besides the problems surrounding various applications of biomedical science and neuroscience (including questions of the nature of the mind), are there any other major new fields of philosophical inquiry, or any major new insights, that have been opened up by social and/or technological change over the past century? Or are most new problems just old problems rehashed with new examples or with greater magnitude?
Eddy Nahmias
May 10, 2012
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Yes, yes, no. There are new fields and insights and its not just old problems rehashed (though the new fields certainly contribute to the old problems). Google "neuroethics"; check out discussions of artificial intelligence or extended mind; look at the way most of the problems considered in philo... Read more
I often read that we must judge arguments or claims based on their own merits, rather than on the quality of the person presenting them. This is fine in realms such as logic or everyday life, where we can all have access to the relevant information, but how does this play out in complex domains, such as science? For instance, suppose I am reading two books on the health effects of different nutrients, such as animal fat. One author claims all animal fat is harmful, the other claims that some animal fats, such as fish fat, is fine in moderation. Both cite studies supporting their views, but one author is a spokesperson for PETA and the other is a senior researcher at a well-known university. As somebody who doesn't have access to biology laboratories to conduct experiments, and who perhaps doesn't have the time to read every source cited, critique every study made and read every attack made on both author's views, what is the best thing for me to do? Should I simply decide not to believe anything at all? It seems this is the only rational course of action, as to take a stand based only on two equally plausible-seeming books and two author biographies would be irrational. Yet simply saying "Oh well, I can't know for sure!" seems rather depressing.
Stephen Maitzen
May 10, 2012
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Your question touches on two much-discussed philosophical topics: the epistemology of (expert and non-expert) testimony and the epistemology of disagreement. You can find accessible discussions of those topics here and here. I won't opine about those topics in general except to say that the aca... Read more
Do the developments in quantum mechanics (i.e. the best we can do on a very micro level is give probability distributions), really have anything to say about free will? It might mean that determinism isn't true (although there could be a weaker "probabilistic determinism" that gives the likelihood of different possible events), but introducing chance into the equation isn't helpful to free will either.
Gabriel Segal
May 9, 2012
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Also agreed.
Here is an argument that determinism doesn’t undermine, butenhances, free will.
(1) Our actions are caused by our propositional attitudes,such as desire, hope, acceptance and belief.
(2) The more deterministic the relationship between out attitudesand our actions, the more freedom of wil... Read more