Recent Responses
Me and my professor are disagreeing about the nature of logic. He claims that logic is prescribes norms for correct reasoning, and is thus normative. I claim that logic is governed by a few axioms (just like any in any other discipline, i.e. science) that one is asked to accept, and then follows deductively, free of any normative claims. My question is: which side is more sound? Thank you.
Richard Heck
September 15, 2012
(changed September 15, 2012)
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Without disagreeing with Stephen's fine response, let me point out one other issue. You say that "logic is governed by a few axioms...and then follows deductively, without any normative claims". But there is no "following deductively" without logic: logic is about the correct norms of de... Read more
what is the difference between logical necessity and metaphysical necessity?
Stephen Maitzen
September 8, 2012
(changed September 8, 2012)
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I think of logical necessity as (predictably enough) the necessity imposed by the laws of logic. So, for example, it's logically necessary that no proposition and its negation are both true, a necessity imposed by the law of noncontradiction. But one might regard logical necessity as... Read more
Where in philosophy does the question of "cost" arise, if at all? If someone presents us with a "moral imperative," is it even permissible to ask "what does it cost?" or do we simply abdicate that answer to economists and psychologists?
Thomas Pogge
September 7, 2012
(changed September 7, 2012)
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The question of cost arises in different accounts of morality in different ways.
Consequentialist accounts may center around the moral imperative to act so as to make the outcome best. Here cost is factored in by considering how a candidate course of conduct will affect various people, in... Read more
Frequently, one finds the following statment: "You cannot prove a negative." My question is, in this context, what is meant by the word "negative?" I understand how the word is used in mathematics and I "think" I know the meaning when used in logic. I just cannot seem to get a handle on how it is used here. Moreover, does it, perhaps, refer to a total position in the debate over the existence of God? Any comments you would make would be greatly appreciate. I enjoy your application very much and, moreso, since I am so old. Thanks. JH
Thomas Pogge
September 7, 2012
(changed September 7, 2012)
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This is a pretty confusing expression. What's usually meant, I think, is that a negative general proposition -- a proposition asserting that a certain kind never occurs -- requires much more by way of justification from its defender than from its opponent. Take the proposition "there are n... Read more
The notion of something being a "fake" seems linguistically odd. Normally, if you have an adjective and a noun, the noun notes what the thing being talked about is, and the adjective describes some quality of the thing in question. A "fake plant", however, doesn't seem to fit that pattern at all, because a fake plant isn't a plant to begin with; the noun seems to be violating its intended function. Is "fake" something other than an adjective, then, perhaps analogous to "not a"? Or is a "fake plant" actually a "fakeplant", i.e. the fake is a part of the noun rather than an adjective, despite its apparent form? Doesn't the adjective "fake" somehow undermine the purpose of nouns?
Richard Heck
September 4, 2012
(changed September 4, 2012)
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One point worth noting here is that words like "fake" are, so far as I can see, always intensional. meaning that whether something is a fake F depends upon what property F is, and not just which things are F. They are also "attributive", meaning that an Adj-Noun isn't just an Adj that is... Read more
There is a classic dilemma about a careening streetcar threatening to kill five people, but where you by operating a switch can force the streetcar onto a different track, saving the five, but killing one other person. The dilemma intends to illustrate the different positions taken by a consequentialist and a cathegorical kantian. How would a virtue ethicist act in this situation? It seems like utilitarians and deonthologists neatly split the moral world in true dichotomies, leaving little room for virtue ethics. But put in a situation like the dilemma, even the virtue ethicist has to act either way, and how does he argue then? Relying on a set of ever so noble virtues wouldn't help very much.
Charles Taliaferro
September 3, 2012
(changed September 3, 2012)
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Thank you for these observations and the question of how virtue ethics comes into play with the streetcar thought experiment! The dilemma is, indeed, intended to force us to think about the moral status of action versus omission, and this goes to the heart of some utilitarian and Ka... Read more
About a year and a half ago I read Henri Bergson's work Matter and Memory for one of my philosophy classes. I have begun to reread the his work and can not help but wonder: what is M. Bergson's place in the history of philosophy? I find many of his arguments to be convincing, but where do he, and his arguments, stand after the philosophical works that the analytic tradition produced? I have tried to learn more about M. Bergson as a person and thinker, but I have been unsuccessful in finding anything relevant after the advent of the analytic tradition. I do know that he won the Nobel Prize for literature for his work, Creative Evolution, but then it would seem as though his work became unimportant. So, I guess my general question is: does M. Bergson have any importance to philosophy today, and where does he stand in relation to present-day philosophy and the analytic tradition? Would a philosopher of the analytic tradition today think that M. Bergson's work is not useful to philosophy?
Oliver Leaman
August 30, 2012
(changed August 30, 2012)
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It is interesting how philosophers go completely out of fashion, and sometimes come back in, but this is quite rare. There is no reason why someone should not read Bergson and find some excellent arguments and ideas in it, but to continue arguing in the ways in which he did would be to invite... Read more
The responses to questions on this site regarding the ethics of eating animals seem to indicate that many of you endorse vegetarianism (in some form or another) but have not made a commitment to actually becoming a vegetarian. Though I understand the difficulty of truly living in accordance with certain philosophies that one might, in theory, endorse, the only major challenge faced by vegetarians in today's America is self control. If philosophers themselves find it so difficult to simply not put a piece of flesh in their mouths, how can we hope for considerable progress on this issue? One would think that the people who think so much about the minutiae of the arguments for and against eating meat would be the most likely to make a shift in their behavior. I can't help but worry.
Eddy Nahmias
August 30, 2012
(changed August 30, 2012)
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Well, weakness of will is a human frailty, and philosophers are humans. But I share your intuition that someone who has accepted strong arguments for a conclusion, such as "It is wrong to eat meat," and who faces few difficulties acting on that conclusion, should be able to act on it. It may... Read more
The notion of something being a "fake" seems linguistically odd. Normally, if you have an adjective and a noun, the noun notes what the thing being talked about is, and the adjective describes some quality of the thing in question. A "fake plant", however, doesn't seem to fit that pattern at all, because a fake plant isn't a plant to begin with; the noun seems to be violating its intended function. Is "fake" something other than an adjective, then, perhaps analogous to "not a"? Or is a "fake plant" actually a "fakeplant", i.e. the fake is a part of the noun rather than an adjective, despite its apparent form? Doesn't the adjective "fake" somehow undermine the purpose of nouns?
Richard Heck
September 4, 2012
(changed September 4, 2012)
Permalink
One point worth noting here is that words like "fake" are, so far as I can see, always intensional. meaning that whether something is a fake F depends upon what property F is, and not just which things are F. They are also "attributive", meaning that an Adj-Noun isn't just an Adj that is... Read more
Does the word 'being' have a meaning?
Stephen Maitzen
August 30, 2012
(changed August 30, 2012)
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Yes, of course. More than one. See this link. Let us know if any of those definitions prompt a philosophical question.
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