Recent Responses
How can we be sure that dreaming is a real phenomenon? It seems like there is no scientifically objective way to know that a person is dreaming; the most we can do is ask them. We are relying on our own subjective experiences, which we cannot verify, and the words of others, which we cannot verify either. REM sleep is correlated with claims of dreaming, but mental activity isn't granular enough to figure out whether a person is in fact *experiencing* an absurd fantasy world rather than simple darkness. Is it possible to approach dreams and dreaming scientifically, if we have no way to examine or verify them or their existence in any way beyond subjective claims?
Eddy Nahmias
February 6, 2014
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These are great questions. There have been philosophical arguments that suggest that it is impossible to know whether dreams occur while we sleep or are just confabulations we create as or after we awake (call this 'dream skepticism'). These arguments fail once we consider all the evidence... Read more
On 'Cogito Ergo Sum' If this statement means that the only thing I can know to be true is that I exist, then that means I don't know if the reasoning used to deduce this statement is logically sound. What evidence do we have that our reasoning is to be believed? The only reason that we trust our reasoning is because have reasoned that it is trustworthy. We trust our reasoning because we trust our reasoning. I know that I came to this conclusion with the same human logic as cogito ergo sum, so this conclusion must be equally invalid. Humans are imperfect->humans 'invented' logic-> logic is not necessarily perfect. "I do not know if I know anything." Please fix any broken logic I have, or point me in the direction of relevant articles on how my thinking was outdone hundreds of years ago. Thanks
Stephen Maitzen
February 1, 2014
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I don't mean to criticize Prof. Reid's excellent scholarly response on behalf of Descartes. But it's worth pointing out that the reasoning from the Second Replies that he attributes to Descartes is more complex and dubitable than the inference from 'I think' to 'I exist' is to begin with.... Read more
Do minute quantities of alcohol consumption enhance or degrade philosophical enlightenment?
Stephen Maitzen
February 1, 2014
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I don't know how alcohol affects philosophical enlightenment, but it wouldn't surprise me if alcohol (especially in more than minute quantities) enhanced many people's desire to wax philosophical. Really, you've asked an empirical question; without a systematic experiment, all anyone coul... Read more
Why don't determinists believe, at least partially, in the notion of free will? If all events are simply outcomes of antecedent choices and events, wouldn't my decisions now affect me, to some degree, in the future? Thanks for considering this question, as rudimentary as it may seem.
Stephen Maitzen
February 1, 2014
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Many philosophers believe in both determinism and the existence of free will. Even more philosophers accept at least the compatibility of determinism and free will: they're known as 'compatibilists' (see this link). Some philosophers go so far as to say that free will requires determinism... Read more
Is it wrong to fantasize about sex with children? If a pedophile never acts on their fantasies are they still guilty of having evil thoughts, assuming that their abstinence comes out of a genuine desire not to do harm?
Nicholas D. Smith
February 13, 2014
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I'm sympathetic to most of what Professor Heck says, if we consider things from a deontological or even a consequentialist point of view, where the relevant consequences are external to the agent. Fantasy does not violate anyone's rights, and fantasy that never motivates action will... Read more
Do philosophers avoid figures of speech in peer reviewed philosphy journals? What about in everyday life; is there a lower standard of conduct when talking to non-philosophers?
Richard Heck
February 1, 2014
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By "figures of speech", I'll assume you mean something like metaphor. And, if so, then, no, philosophers do not avoid metaphor, at least not entirely. Here is one of my favorite philosophical metaphors, from W. V. O. Quine: "The lore of our fathers is a fabric of sentences. ...It is a pale g... Read more
I recently heard someone make an argument, something like- "if you accept that there is morality in sex, for example that a father having sex with his daughter is wrong, you can't say gay sex isn't immoral because people should be able to do whatever they want because it causes no harm to others" Is this argument or proof begging the question? Philosophically, what is wrong with this argument.
Richard Heck
February 1, 2014
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The main thing wrong with the argument is that it is terrible. Don't we think it's wrong for parents to have sex with their children precisely because we think that it is harmful to the children? One might also think that children have no genuine capacity to consent to sex, an issue that als... Read more
First, I want to clarify that indeterminism is there exists no fact to the matter about future events. It is different than saying that the future is extremely hard to predict. In other words, some say that a coin flip in indeterministic. However, assuming that all particles (atoms, and molecules, etc) behave in mathematically predictable ways, then an omniscient being, knowing the physical properties of all relevant matter (the coin, air current, force of flip, etc) should be able to predict the outcome. Therefore, a simple coin flip is not evidence of indeterminism, because its out come is theoretically (though not practically) possible to determine. Is this a correct way to interpret the view? Second, where do indeterminist think that indeterminism can come from, given the standard view that all matter follows predictable laws of physics?
Richard Heck
February 1, 2014
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I don't work on these things myself, but I'll make one point quickly. Nowadays, it isn't at all obvious that you could predict what will happen when the coin is flipped if you knew all the relevant physical facts about the present, for the simple reason of quantum indeterminacy. It may be th... Read more
Why don't analytic philosphers in the Anglosphere take a stronger stand against continental psychoanalysis which is divorced from medical findings?
Richard Heck
February 1, 2014
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The question seems to presume that it is the job of philosophers as such to take such stands, and that seems wrong to me. Whether psychoanalysis is a helpful form of treatment, and for what conditions, just isn't the kind of question philosophers are well-placed to answer. In particular, whe... Read more
Many people immediately dismiss the following claim: Either something lacks subjective experience, or it does not. Of course, I am talking about consciousness--but I am specifically referring to Nagel's wording, "something it is like to be." Intelligent zombies may not apply. Being such an unpopular claim, it should not be difficult to cite literature refuting it. What are the first two articles and the first two books I should look to in hopes of finding the refutation? Could you begin to refute the claim here? What literature might I read in defense of this claim?
Richard Heck
February 1, 2014
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I'm a bit confused. The claim you say "people immediately dismiss" looks like an instance of the law of excluded middle: Either P or not-P. People are often tempted to deny excluded middle in cases of vagueness, but I don't recall a lot of people saying that it can be vague whether a creatur... Read more