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I have a question about "solved" games, and the significance of games to artificial intelligence. I take it games provide one way to assess artificial intelligence: if a computer is able to win at a certain game, such as chess, this provides evidence that the computer is intelligent. Suppose that in the future scientists manage to solve chess, and write an algorithm to play chess according to this solution. By hypothesis, then, a computer running this algorithm wins every game whenever possible. Would we conclude on this basis that the computer is intelligent? I have an intuition that intelligence cannot be reduced to any such algorithm, however complex. But that seems quite strange in a way, because it suggests that imperfect play might somehow demonstrate greater intelligence or creativity than perfect play. [If the notion of "solving" chess is problematic, another approach is to consider a computer which plays by exhaustively computing every possible sequence of moves. This is unfeasible with current technology, of course. But we can imagine a futuristic computer which has such great raw power that it's able to play effectively using this otherwise exceedingly "dumb" strategy.]
William Rapaport
June 12, 2014
(changed June 12, 2014)
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Update: An interesting article about one of my computer science colleagues on the subject of cheating in chess and touching on the nature of "intelligence" in chess just appeared in Chess Life magazine; the link is here
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This is a follow-up to Miriam Solomon's statement describing philosophy: "Philosophy involves more than deductive logic--it involves the exercise of "good judgment" which in fact we do not understand very well." (june 5, 2014) Can someone tell me more about what this "good judgment" is, please? I studied philosophy in college and I can't recall any of my professors ever suggesting that there was some elusive guiding principle in philosophy beyond what could be articulated...Instead, I was taught that it was about starting with premises and then executing deductive reasoning. Are you now saying that there's something mystical in there that philosophers can't articulate but which guides their work? That seems counter the way I learned philosophy, where the professors seemed particularly intent on articulating things clearly.
Richard Heck
June 12, 2014
(changed June 12, 2014)
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I'll just add that, for similar reasons, "good judgement" is equally important in mathematics, and nothing is more deductive than mathematics.
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The ancient Greek philosophical schools taught comprehensive philosophies of life. For them, the whole point of doing philosophy was to determine how to live well. Why do contemporary philosophers not publish philosophies of life? Has the point of doing philosophy changed? If so, why?
Andrew Pessin
July 10, 2014
(changed July 10, 2014)
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or for another kind of response, you might still ask why many/most philosophers don't publish philosophies of life. You'd have to do an empirical survey there, but i'm guessing that for many, a philosophy of life is too big and hard to construct. Much easier to focus on some relatively narrow pro... Read more
This is a follow-up to Miriam Solomon's statement describing philosophy: "Philosophy involves more than deductive logic--it involves the exercise of "good judgment" which in fact we do not understand very well." (june 5, 2014) Can someone tell me more about what this "good judgment" is, please? I studied philosophy in college and I can't recall any of my professors ever suggesting that there was some elusive guiding principle in philosophy beyond what could be articulated...Instead, I was taught that it was about starting with premises and then executing deductive reasoning. Are you now saying that there's something mystical in there that philosophers can't articulate but which guides their work? That seems counter the way I learned philosophy, where the professors seemed particularly intent on articulating things clearly.
Richard Heck
June 12, 2014
(changed June 12, 2014)
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I'll just add that, for similar reasons, "good judgement" is equally important in mathematics, and nothing is more deductive than mathematics.
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Is it possible to make a clear distinction between kitsch and sentimentality? It seems to me that many philosophers equate the sentimental with shallow and inauthentic, but I assume that most of them wouldn't say it always bad to be tenderly moved by a story or event. But at the same time it seems much popular literature, television, and film really aims to ratchet up the emotions: is this not problematic? Sorry, running different questions together, but I'm just trying to figure out how to understand when the sentimental is good and when it is not. Thank your for your interesting website.
Oliver Leaman
June 7, 2014
(changed June 7, 2014)
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I doubt that there is a distinction to be made between kitsch and the sentimental. What is wrong with these aesthetic categories is that they are so undemanding. I very much enjoy both, especially the little cute things one can hang from bags, like the small animals and symbols, and also the emotio... Read more
It seems to me that much contemporary philosophy is a bit obsessed with clarifying arguments and analyzing statements and lacks real wisdom about the world. For example, I can imagine a typical situation where an ordinary person asks a professional philosopher a question relating to an applied ethics question. The philosopher answers by analysing the component parts of the statements contained within the question and attempting to assess the technicalities of the implicit argument put forward by the ordinary person. The outcome is that everybody is none the wiser as to the real answer to the applied ethics question because the philosopher has no real wisdom about the world but is merely trying to analyse argument structures! What do you think about this? Thanks
Daniel Koltonski
June 6, 2014
(changed June 6, 2014)
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I'm not sure that the outcome of analysing arguments is always that no one is any wiser concerning the issue at stake. And that's because there are several possible results of such analysis, all of which would seem to help us better understand the issue at stake and the justifiability of possibl... Read more
I currently study philosophy at an undergraduate level at Trinity College Dublin, and I am interested in pursuing philosophy of mind at a graduate level – certainly with a PhD. That's the hope anyway. I have considered perhaps doing something like an MPhil at Cambridge. Yet, I am concerned that a lot of work in philosophy of mind doesn't seem to take into account where it sits on the boundary between science and philosophy, and a lot of what we get is some sort of babble that doesn't fit into what we know from science. Often, there is a lot of stuff that thinks it is informed by science, but really isn't – out of simple ignorance. I like David Chalmers's views on this: "Everything I say here is compatible with the results of contemporary science; our picture of the natural world is broadened, not overturned." I have considered completing an MSc in Neuroscience that doesn't take things from a philosophy perspective. There are quite a few programs, such as one at my own university, that accept students who come from a philosophy background, but are not actually philosophy-based, but instead the actual science of neuroscience. I think there would be a lot gained from doing something like this, because I am truly interested in making headway at the issues in philosophy of mind, while being informed about the science side of things. My question is: how would an MSc in Neuroscience be viewed when applying to a Philosophy PhD program, such as the one at MIT (which allows the possibility of coming out with a minor in cognitive science)? Would that "year away from philosophy" hurt me – and even if the "year away" isn't the issue, would having completed a non-philosophy MSc be viewed negatively? How about if I was to go on to do the one-year MPhil at Cambridge (maybe it would even be an issue applying for this) after the MSc and then apply to PhD programs? I am interested in US programs, for a multitude of reasons. I have also thought that doing post-doctoral fellowships could perhaps help me with the neuroscience side of things, but I am quite interested in completing a formal degree in the subject.
Eddy Nahmias
June 6, 2014
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Well, I think your plans sound great. But of course I would, since I helped develop the Neurophilosophy Track in the MA program in philosophy at Georgia State University (www.gsu.edu/philosophy). I'm not just advertising! (though you might consider our program.) I'm suggesting that your view of p... Read more
Is the cause of homosexuality purely a biological and not a philosophical question? Or is there room for philosophical explanation?
Stephen Maitzen
June 6, 2014
(changed June 6, 2014)
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What counts as a cause is certainly a philosophical question, and although both laypeople and scientists often confidently talk about causes, philosophers are far from unanimous about the correct analysis of the concept of causation. It's a matter of considerable controversy: see, for example, th... Read more
What is the essential relationship between rules of grammar and a living language? Is it primarily descriptive or prescriptive? I am fluent in 3 languages, and it seems to me that native speakers, especially in Chinese, rarely know much about the "rules". Native speakers, instead, are confident. They don't worry that what they say is "wrong", and they're also inventive and creative. American kids are fond of saying about someone that "so-and-so is boss". It seems to me there are many instances now of nouns being converted to adjectives: so-and-so might also be "legend", for instance. Native speakers don't fear that they are "wrong". Does grammar play catch up, like law with technology, or does grammar just unctuously go on insisting that such statements are "wrong"?
Jonathan Westphal
June 5, 2014
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It is possible to have a view in which a grammar has some description, and a bit of prescription. If someone speaking English used only "sentences" without verbs, then a bit of prescription might be in order, and the response that "grammar is descriptive not prescriptive" would or should fall o... Read more
I am close to someone with Asperger's syndrome. Do you think Philosophy would be a good field for someone with asperger's to look into? Do you think there's a higher prevalence of it among the philosophy community than other disciplines? In reading through responses, it does seem like there are a lot of superficially logical replies that would feel, to an outsider looking in, on the range from emotionally insensitive to passive-aggressive. It seems that the field encourages ruling out replies based on emotion, being purely logical, which would suit an aspie perfectly. Thanks for your thoughts!
Miriam Solomon
June 5, 2014
(changed June 5, 2014)
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You ask an interesting question. If Philosophy was nothing more than deductive logic, then someone with skills in deductive logic but developmental issues elsewhere would probably excel in philosophy. But most people think that Philosophy involves more than deductive logic--it involves the exerc... Read more