What you seem to mean by "the mysterian attitude" is captured by your later phrases, "throwing in the towel" and "helplessness". In this sense, I don't know that there are any philosophers who count as mysterians, though I suppose Colin McGinn, who holds the view that our mind just cannot entertain the concepts necessary to solve the mind-body problem comes closest. He calls his view "cognitive closure". The idea is that human minds, like those of other animals, have an innate restriction on the range of concepts available to them. But one needn't go as far as McGinn's idea of cognitive closure to acknowledge that the concepts available for framing theoretical hypotheses concerning conscious mental activity - whether based in neuroscience or computational psychology - don't seem adequate to capture the character of conscious experience. But rather than throw up our hands out of frustration, most philosophers, whether they agree with this assessment or not, are continually trying to articulate ever...

Your view about the possibility that people perceive things radically differently is an old philosophical puzzle. The so-called "inverted spectrum" hypothesis is the most common variant. Assuming that color space is organized symmetrically, so that one can switch primary colors like red and green, or blue and yellow, while maintaining all the similarity relations among them, it seems someone could see red wherever others see green and yet there be no difference in their behavior. As you point out, they would learn to call red things "red", even though they looked green to them. Perhaps there could be inversions of other properties as well. So is this really possible? One way of approaching the issue is to distinguish between what we might call the "representational content" of a perceptual experience and its "qualitative character". The representational content is what the perceptual experience is "saying" about the world around you. So if you see a red apple, your visual experience is ...