From a philosophical point of view, what is the difference between truth and fact?

Some talk about facts is just a stylistic variant of truth-talk. For example, in ordinary discourse, to say 'It's a fact that the fast train to London from Cambridge takes less than an hour' is to say no more than that 'It is true that the fast train to London from Cambridge takes less than an hour'. And, arguably, both those in turn say no more than that the fast train to London to Cambridge does take less than an hour.

However there is also a more substantive notion of fact that has a long history in philosophy and has in recent years made something of a comeback -- this is the notion of facts as not truths but truth-makers. The proposition that the fast train to London from Cambridge takes less than an hour is true. And there is, plausibly, something worldly that makes it true, something that has to exist if the proposition is to be true, a truth-maker in short. And what kind of thing is a truth-maker? It isn't enough for London, Cambridge and trains to exist. And adding in the property of being a fast train and the property of taking less than an hour into your catalogue of existent things isn't enough either. No, the objects and the properties have to be put together in the right way to constitute the right fact to make it true that the fast train to London from Cambridge takes less than an hour.

So on this metaphysical view, there are facts (worldly items) which make propositions true. And of course, such a view has to distinguish facts, in the sense of truth-makers, from truths, meaning true propositions.

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