Recent Responses
When something disastrous happens, like Katrina, "logic" says: so much the worse for a loving God. But for the believer, what comes out, instead, are things like "God never gives us more than we can handle" and "We have to praise the Lord, and thank him, that <i>we</i> are OK." Why? (Or is this just a psychological or sociological question? Or did I watch too much Fox news?)
Alan Soble
November 11, 2006
(changed November 11, 2006)
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Plantinga writes, in the quoted passage, "what God sees as better is, of course, better. " Oh? Of course? Having solved to his own satisfaction the problem of evil, can Alvin also solve the Euthyphro-style dilemma that arises here? (1) A world is better because God sees it as better vs. (2)... Read more
Why should I believe you?
Jyl Gentzler
October 11, 2005
(changed October 11, 2005)
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Fair enough, Alan. Based on my experience of human beings, the more sociableand cheerful attitude that you suggest seems appropriate as ageneral day-to-day attitude toward others. I’m generally not worriedthat people are lying to me.
But I understood the question differently– not as direc... Read more
a. Is there a way to prove free will? b. Why can't I choose not to choose? Since everything we do is a choice. Thank you, Jerome
Peter Lipton
October 11, 2005
(changed October 11, 2005)
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a. Many philosophers think that we can't even prove that free will is possible.
b. It's impossible to choose not to choose, precisely because that would be a choice. (And by the way, even if everything we do is a choice, it doesn't follow that we can choose anything.)... Read more
Since we all have a free will and since every sane human being prefers happiness over misery; how come we don´t choose to be good/kind/loving to each other all the time? J.T. Kumberg
Peter Lipton
October 11, 2005
(changed October 11, 2005)
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It might be that every sane human being prefers their own happiness over their own misery; alas it doesn't follow from this that every sane human being always prefers other people's happiness over those people's misery. This comes to the crunch if promoting other people's happiness interfer... Read more
I was perusing the site, and I came up with this weird thought: Can a person think about the thought that they are thinking? Because at first I thought no... but then I thought by posing this question I was thinking about what I was thinking... but I started to doubt my thoughts... so I thought it might be a good idea to get a second opinion.
Richard Heck
October 11, 2005
(changed October 11, 2005)
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Might the question have concerned self-referring thoughts? Viz: Is it possible for me now to think about the very thought I am now thinking?
But, if you think about it, I just did. So it is.
I can do it again: I think that the very thought I am now having is a true one. Is it?... Read more
When something disastrous happens, like Katrina, "logic" says: so much the worse for a loving God. But for the believer, what comes out, instead, are things like "God never gives us more than we can handle" and "We have to praise the Lord, and thank him, that <i>we</i> are OK." Why? (Or is this just a psychological or sociological question? Or did I watch too much Fox news?)
Alan Soble
November 11, 2006
(changed November 11, 2006)
Permalink
Plantinga writes, in the quoted passage, "what God sees as better is, of course, better. " Oh? Of course? Having solved to his own satisfaction the problem of evil, can Alvin also solve the Euthyphro-style dilemma that arises here? (1) A world is better because God sees it as better vs. (2)... Read more
What is truth, and how can we know that it is not an illusion?
Peter Lipton
October 22, 2005
(changed October 22, 2005)
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I'm with Richard here: the truth of a proposition cannot be an illusion. In an illusion, the proposition is false. But there might nevertheless be a sense in which truth could be an illusion, if we think that there are representations when in fact there aren't any. This is paradoxical ter... Read more
I was thinking about properties of objects. We say "sugar is sweet," but is it sweet in the absence of a mind to perceive that it is sweet? Could some other perception find that it is, say, sour instead? Or is it intrinsically sweet on its own, independent of an intellect to observe that it is sweet?
Peter Lipton
October 11, 2005
(changed October 11, 2005)
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There are three main options here that philosophers have developed for properties like sweetness: sweetness is a sensation, it is a disposition in some things to produce a sensation, or it is an intrinsic property of sweet things (presumably to do with their molecular structure). On the fi... Read more
At like an atomic level, like really small, is it possible to determine where one thing stops and another begins? Say like where my finger stops and a key on my keyboard begins? (This might be a bad example, because a plastic key and my finger probably have quite different atoms, but still the line between them would be hard to find right.)
Richard Heck
October 11, 2005
(changed October 11, 2005)
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I'm going to say something here that is way over-simplified, but perhaps it will do.
According to quantum mechanics, of which my knowledge is very limited, such things as atoms don't have distinct boundaries in the sense you have in mind. This is because their parts (protons, neutrons, etc)... Read more
On what basis can we claim somebody is delusional? Assuming objective, True Reality(tm) exists, but is not directly knowable and is only knowable through mediation of our senses, how do we have any solid footing for deciding one person's senses are defective compared to another's? Two thought experiments to illustrate this idea: Assume I am alone in a room, and I see a purple monkey swinging from the lamp. I perceive this odd sight and may, or may not, decide that I'm hallucinating based on my previous experiences. If somebody else comes into the room, and I ask them what they see, if they agree with me, then odds are better that we are both seeing accurately, but if he disagrees with me, then he may be blind to the monkey, or I may be imagining it. Adding more people will get us a consensus view, but doesn't really prove anything in more than a statistical way. Who is delusional, and who is seeing truly? Or, assume I am the one-eyed man in the land of the blind. Like the monkey-seeing fellow in the previous example, I perceive odd, starnge things those around me don't. From the previous statistical argument, I'm just as likely delusional as the monkey-fellow, but in this case, I'm actually seeing something my compatriots are literally blind to. This would imply that "group opinion" is insufficient to discern hallucination from enhanced perception. So, how should such a determination be made?
Richard Heck
October 11, 2005
(changed October 11, 2005)
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There seems to be a pattern of argument here that needs to be questioned. It is: (i) Method M for reaching judgements isn't completely reliable; therefore, (ii) method M can't be trusted. The conclusion simply doesn't follow. Method M might be very reliable, in which case it can be trusted t... Read more