Recent Responses
If you were to look back at a certain period (of time) that you did something, can you say with certainty (most likely) you would have done a different action instead of the action that you took that lead you to the present you. Or does it become another probability that you cannot infer that you would have most likely done things differently. Say for example you said that you would have most likely went to school B if you did not go to school A. Are you saying that if you went back to that instance in time, knowing all the stuff that you did you would most likely have chosen school B given your circumstances of you at the past without any of the future biases that you hold from choosing school A? Or does it become another possibility of a what if scenario where you cannot infer that you would have done this or that to certain degree? How can you say for certain you would have done that when you did not (choose school A) therefore there would be no certainty in what you would have done in the past?
If you go back to that choice
Stephen Maitzen
July 22, 2021
(changed July 22, 2021)
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If you go back to that choice point exactly as it was -- with your beliefs, desires, and circumstances being exactly as they were originally -- then why think that you would have made a different choice? We can't make sense of your choosing differently unless we ima... Read more
What's wrong with eating animals? Animals eat animals, so it's natural.
The first point is that "Is
Allen Stairs
July 15, 2021
(changed July 15, 2021)
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The first point is that "Is it natural?" and "Is it wrong?" aren't the same question. We could spend a lot of time on what it means to call something "natural," but you seem to have something like this in mind: if there are species that do it routinely, then it's na... Read more
Consider two identical sets, A and B; but they're not identical, because they have different names. Paradox?
If a paradox resulted every
Stephen Maitzen
July 15, 2021
(changed July 15, 2021)
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If a paradox resulted whenever one thing had more than one name, then these paradoxes wouldn't be restricted to sets. The names 'Samuel Clemens' and 'Mark Twain' would generate a paradox by referring to the same person. But, of course, there's no paradox here. Everyth... Read more
Is necrophilia morally objectionable? I was under the impression that it wouldn't be, insofar that bodies don't have legitimate interests (e.g., physical or psychological well-being) to be damaged, but a friend pointed out to me that people who are alive now still have wishes regarding what should be done once they are dead. For example, they leave money to their children in their wills, and are able to live contently knowing that this will be honored. If we lived in a society where people's wishes were routinely disregarded after death, then we would have no reason to think that our own wishes would be honored, and we would therefore be distressed by this. Any thoughts would be appreciated.
Like my colleague, I agree
Allen Stairs
June 17, 2021
(changed June 17, 2021)
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Like my colleague, I agree that you've put your finger on a potential moral problem with necrophilia. However, I have a worry about the rest of his analysis. My colleague writes: "I think the more primordial objection to necrophilia is that most of us see the good of sexu... Read more
Is necrophilia morally objectionable? I was under the impression that it wouldn't be, insofar that bodies don't have legitimate interests (e.g., physical or psychological well-being) to be damaged, but a friend pointed out to me that people who are alive now still have wishes regarding what should be done once they are dead. For example, they leave money to their children in their wills, and are able to live contently knowing that this will be honored. If we lived in a society where people's wishes were routinely disregarded after death, then we would have no reason to think that our own wishes would be honored, and we would therefore be distressed by this. Any thoughts would be appreciated.
Like my colleague, I agree
Allen Stairs
June 17, 2021
(changed June 17, 2021)
Permalink
Like my colleague, I agree that you've put your finger on a potential moral problem with necrophilia. However, I have a worry about the rest of his analysis. My colleague writes: "I think the more primordial objection to necrophilia is that most of us see the good of sexu... Read more
Dear sir or Madame, I have a question about patents in philosophy. I have had ideas about science and society for quite a while now (like everyone). And I have (I think) created a small philosophy. I was wondering, if I would come op with a complete new philosophy, how one could patent it. For example, Any Rand gets the credit of being the founder of Objectivism, not someone who stole her idea. In the industry and sciences, one can easily patent something, via institutions. But how does this work for a philosophy? Thank you very much and with kind regards,
Einstein gets credit for
Allen Stairs
May 28, 2021
(changed May 28, 2021)
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Einstein gets credit for relativity, but (in spite of his having been a patent clerk) not a patent. Not all innovations are patentable, and in the sciences, philosophy, history... this is a very good thing. If something is patented, then others typically have to pay to use it... Read more
When a person asserts unequivocably and with strong conviction that it is simply wrong to kill animals for food, and you notice that they are wearing leather, how do you respond?
If you're asking whether
Allen Stairs
May 20, 2021
(changed May 20, 2021)
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If you're asking whether there's a tension between what they say and the message implicit in what they wear, the answer, of course, is yes. If you're asking how I would actually respond, that's partly a question of social judgment. If it seemed appropriate in the circums... Read more
A quick question about animal ethics. Presumably, the philosopher who responds to this would agree that if we were currently doing to humans what we do to animals in our food systems—that is, breeding and slaughtering them by the billions every year, not out of nutritional necessity, but for the sake of taste pleasure—that would be immoral. (I sure hope so!) So the question is: What is the trait absent in nonhuman animals that, if also absent in humans, would justify breeding and slaughtering humans by the billions for something as trivial as taste pleasure? The knee-jerk justification today’s nonvegans would give is that, relative to humans, animals have diminished mental capacities, and that mass confinement and slaughter is therefore acceptable. But surely intelligence can’t be the trait, because the same nonvegans would never dream of arguing that it’s okay to confine and slaughter a human being (let alone billions of them) just because he has a level of intelligence equivalent to that of a pig or cow. Neither can the missing trait be the ability to experience physical pain or psychological suffering, both of which, according to scientists like Jane Goodall, animals like cows, pigs, chickens (and yes, even fish!) evolved to do. So what is the trait? Or what are the traits? (Full disclosure: I do not believe the trait or group of traits exists.)
I am not one who thinks that
Peter S. Fosl
May 8, 2021
(changed May 8, 2021)
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I am not one who thinks that concentrated animal feed operations (CAFOs) and other practices of raising, killing, and eating non-human animals are justified. Where possible (and it's not for all human possible) veganism is morally preferable. Now, Jane Goodall isn't really... Read more
Hey! This is a question about induction and probability to help settle a debate! If more thing As are observed in Group X than Group Y, and we were to take a subset of Group X and Y, is it not the case that it is more likely, by which I mean it is more probable, than Subset X has more As than Subset Y, all other things being equal? It's POSSIBLE that subset X does not have more than subset Y , but based on what we know from the premise, is it not the case that we would say the probability of Group X having more thing As is higher? Thanks!
As it stands, your question
Allen Stairs
May 6, 2021
(changed May 6, 2021)
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As it stands, your question contains some crucial ambiguities. You ask about a case where more As are observed in group X than in group Y, but it's really not clear what "observed" means here. Do you mean that quite literally, more things that are A have been, so to speak, c... Read more
I believe having an evil thought such as killing your neighbor for no reason is morally wrong, but not legally wrong unless you act on it. Why aren't all immoral things also illegal?
Let's stick with criminal law
Allen Stairs
March 25, 2021
(changed March 25, 2021)
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Let's stick with criminal law here. One obvious reason why "immoral" doesn't entail "illegal" is that what's legal, what's not, and what the punishments are needs to be clear. In a functioning legal system, it's generally possible to determine in advance wheth... Read more