Hi, A logically fallacious argument, as far as I understand should always be invalid - in every possible world. But take a kid's argument : This is true, because my father said so. On one hand it seems obviously invalid. Such an attitude is never smart (of course, I do not imply a case in which the father is known to be an expert in something, and therefore is a valid authority, but a kid's childish attitude). However, there is a possible world in which the father of the kid is omniscient and always telling the truth. It seems a logical possibility. But, if it is a logical possibility, then one cannot argue the argument is _logically_ invalid. Sincerely, Sam

A logically valid argument is one that has the property that, if its premises are true, then its conclusion must also be true. It's a nice question how exactly one wants to spell that out, but if we play along with the talk about "possible worlds", then we can say: A logically valid argument is one that has the property that, if, in any given world, its premises are true, then, in that world, its conclusion must be true. On that understanding, the kid's argument is logically invalid. True, there are some worlds in which everything the kid's father says is true. But that is not enough. For the argument to be valid, this has to be so in all worlds, and it obviously isn't. I think the confusion here may be caused by the phrase "always...invalid, in every possible world". Validity is preservation of truth in every world. But what happens in every world isn't really affected by which world you are in, so talk of what's valid in every world doesn't really make sense. What's valid in one world...

Opponents to gay marriage often argue that marriage is "by definition" a union between one man and one women. I support gay marriage myself, but this kind of argument is interesting to me--I'm not sure what to make of it. What does it mean to say that marriage is, by definition, thus and so? (Is this just a statement about the way people tend to use the word "marriage"?) More importantly, should we ever be persuaded by such arguments?

Let me add a few words to Sean's excellent response. I think one thing worth keeping in mind here, which I may have said already in response to a similar question, is that the institution of marriage in the United States, and in some other places in the developed world, has changed a great deal over the last sixty years or so. A friend of mine once joked, "Of course marriage has to be between a man and a woman. Otherwise, how would you know who gets to beat up whom?" Not very funny, of course, in one sense, but perhaps you see her point. There was a time, not very long ago, when it was legally impossible in many states for a woman to be raped by her husband. A married woman's ability to own property independently of her husband was curtailed in some jurisdictions. Men had, by law, that kind of control over their wives, and the entire institution of marriage was one of ownership. That is why many radicals of the Victorian and post-Victorian eras were deeply suspicious of the entire institution...
Sex

There has been some debate surrounding sex dolls (expensive, life-size, quasi-realistic approximations of humans intended for use as sex toys). On the one hand, proponents claim sex dolls are a useful sexual surrogate for men who are socially challenged and "sexually frustrated", and who want a more "realistic" experience than self-sex (the assumption is these men are not able to find dates themselves). On the other hand, feminists decry these life-like sex dolls (which are predominantly female-shaped and bought by males) as misogynistic, because (feminists claim) they are advocated as a replacement for women and reinforce the stereotypes that women are hard to deal with for men, not to mention being the example par excellence of objectification of women. Which is it? Is it valid to say that these dolls can play a healthy role in a socially challenged persons life, or are these things which reinforce misogyny and should not be promoted or made to seem acceptable?

I guess you're talking about "Real Dolls" and the like, of which Howard Stern seems to be such a fan. The terms in which you describe this debate seem to me to be highly contentious. I really do not understand why the question whether someone is "socially challenged" or "sexually frustrated" has anything to do with it. I think the sensible, default viewpoint would be that, if someone wants to masturbate, then they should be free to do so in whatever way they choose, either alone or with their partner or whatever. And if they enjoy using sex toys, then they should be free to use them, too. If one of the sex toys they like to use is a "love doll", either of the blow up variety or the incredibly expensive "Real Doll" variety, then so what? Maybe they like to fantasize about making love to super models, and maybe the doll helps with the fantasy. Great! Feminists like Nancy Friday worked very hard to earn all of us, men and women, the right to such freedom. That said, "so what" could have an answer,...

Hi! Firstly, I'm sorry about my poor English. It's not my first language but I hope you can understand my question. Thanks. About Democracy. We know a government can't be democratic unless its laws are confirmed by majority of people. On the other hand, we know the majority can't force the society the oppressive laws. Is not that a paradox?! And what is the line which limit the majority?! For example: in a Muslim country, the majority may want all women dress veil. Does not it mean an oppression to some women who don't like veils?!On the other hand, in that society, if the law lets women dress or not dress veil, can such a law be democratic although it's not confirmed by the majority?! Please note my question is not only about veil in a Muslim society, it's about democracy and its way about such situations. When and where the democracy can ignore the majority will without losing its democratic nature?!

This problem, of the "tyrrany of the majority", is a very old one in political theory, and it is also one of the major practical problems every democracy must negotiate. Theoretically and historically, its solution lies in the emergence of what are sometimes called "liberal democracies". The term "liberal", in this usage, is not as opposed to "conservative" but rather concerns "liberties", that is, rights that each citizen has and that serve to protect his or her interests from the majority. In the United States, for example, these rights included those enshrined in the first ten amendments to our constitution, which are collectively known as the Bill of Rights. The first of these reads: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. Exactly what this language...

Video games cause violent behavior. Is that an example of a baseless speculation or is it a reasonable but vaguely founded idea? It seems somewhat plausible but its plausibility seems kind of vague so I can kind of sympathize with the ultra-logical "Reason Magazine" types dismissing it out of hand. On the other hand that kind of dismissal which says that if you can't think of a definite reason for an opinion then it's wrong seems kind of glib, because their does seem to be something to it. After all as general psychological rule we tend to think that encouraging a behavior leads to a behavior and some people might see imaginary violence as a form of encouragement.... but it really does seem like a kind of reasoning that lies somewhere between gut instinct and reason doesn't it? I guess my question is really more epistemological than directly pertaining to the question of whether or not images cause violence. Is this simply a case of balancing human social instinct over pure reasoning or is there a more...

The question whether video games cause violent behavior is an empirical one. That is, it's one that has to be decided by looking carefully at the evidence, not by reflection on what seems plausible and what doesn't, and anyone who would "dismiss" such a claim "out of hand" is not being very reasonable at all. Nor is someone who bases such an opinion on a vague feeling that "imaginary violence [is] a form of encouragement" being very reasonable. Fortunately, the social scientists who study these sorts of things have other tools. That is not to say, of course, that the tools are sufficient to answer the question, and of course it continues to be controversial whether video games, or other sorts of "media violence", lead to increased violence in practice. It's difficult to account, in practice, for all the variables. That said, I think most researchers would agree that exposure to media violence does tend to make one less sensitive to the real suffering such violence causes and so does tend to make one...

Is this sentence true: "Miles Davis and narwhals both have horns." The word "horn" can mean a musical instrument (which only Miles Davis has) or a bony protrusion (which only narwhals have.) But is it possible to mean both things at once (which would make the sentence true). Or does the sentence only have two possible meanings, both of which are false?

This phenomenon is well-known. It's a form of zeugma that is known as "syllepsis". I think most linguists would say that this sentence cannot mean that Miles has a trumpet and a narwhal a protrusion from the head. The reason is the obvious one: that "horn" has to be interpreted a single way. Note that, if correct, this shows that "Ms and Ns are F" is not , as we sometimes tell our introductory logic students, simply an abbreviation (or something) for "Ms are F and Ns are F", since, in the latter, "F" could be interpreted differently in its two occurrences. When one makes a claim like the one just made, we are talking about how the sentence is immediately, unreflectively, and automatically understood by a hearer. So what I'm observing is, in effect, simply that our "language faculty" operates a certain way, and not another way that it could, in principle, have operated. And put that way, the point should be fairly uncontroversial. The humorous effect one can get from syllepsis depends the fact...

I'd like to follow up something that was discussed in question 4096 (http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/4096). In Richard Heck's response to a question about the term "vulgar" he gives an example of an English slang term "gyp" meaning to cheat, which was derived from gypsy. As he mentions, this is considered offensive to gypsies. And, as he also mentions, many non-gypsies are not familiar with this issue and mean no disrespect to gypsies when they use the term. Heck goes on to say "One would not be blameworthy for that usage, but, once informed of its consequences, one should stop using the term." So my question is where is the line here? What if someone "informs" me that XYZ group is offended by some action I take. What if I'm not sure they're correct? What if actually some XYZs are offended and others are not? Does it matter how many people are in the XYZ group, and whether I believe they will actually witness my action? A considerate person wouldn't want to needlessly offend anyone, but at some...

All of these are good questions, but we should distinguish two issues. The first issue is as to the moral facts. I claim that if you come to know that use of some term is offensive to the members of some group, then you ought not to use that term. It's an entirely different question, of course, whether someone's telling you does lead you to have such knowledge, or whether your refusing to believe them might be unreasonable, and so forth. Questions about how many people in the group find use of the term offensive are another matter. We might well suppose, for example, that some people of gypsy descent are unaware of the origin of the term "gyp", or that some American Indians might be unaware of the origin of the term "Indian summer". Others might be aware of the origin, but think very few other people are, and so not themselves find use of the term to be offensive. So, well, it's complicated. I haven't thought about this deeply, but I'm inclined to think that the issue here isn't one of numbers,...

With each language in the world there seems to be a set number of words, some have more it seems and some have less. My question is that in a language that has less words, is it limited in it's ability to conceptualize and describe and thus understand less about it's reality around it, or is it's simplistic view what gives a clearer view of things? Follow up: If you can't define a word without using another word, wouldn't words be subjective?

I tend to agree with theoretical linguists such as Chomsky that there are really no such things as languages, in the sense in which English and German are supposed to be "public languages". Rather, there are just people who talk, and some of them can understand each other. I mention this because it is surely not an essential feature of any language, in that sense, that it has some particular number of words. Words get added and removed all the time. So it's hard to ask the question in these terms. Let's focus on "idiolects". Each of us has our own idiolect, which is in various ways like and unlike the idiolects of other people. Each of these has, at any given time, a certain number of words in it. Now: Does understanding more words contribute to one's being able to conceptualize and describe more? Other things equal, one would suppose so, and it's hard to see why this ability would, in and of itself, make one's view of things any less clear, though I suppose one might miss the forest for the trees,...

I was reading a text claiming that people who believe that God is contingent may be uncomfortable with the implications of contingency. The author cited the Barcan formula. Could you please explain what this formula means and why it's controversial? I'm not great at logic. Thanks!

Wikipedia has a decent entry on the Barcan formula. It is generally held to imply that nothing exists contingently, and that in turn is generally thought insane. I would seem to be a good example of something that exists only contingently. But there are some people who think the Barcan formula can be defended, and it would be nice if it could because it makes certain aspects of modal logic much easier than they otherwise are. That said, I am finding it hard to imagine why the Barcan formula and its consequences would be relevant here. If you believe that God exists contingently, then you think the Barcan formula is false. Since not many people accept it, that isn't much of a loss.

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