I have a very basic question about Frege's object/concept distinction. Please don't make fun of me as I'm new to early analytic philosophy. This question has been bugging me for a while, so I'd appreciate a thorough answer.
In sentences like "the cat is grey" or "the cat is in the park," do the words 'the cat' designate an object? If you were to formalize these sentences, I would think it would go as something like: there is some x such that x is a cat and x is grey/in a park. There wouldn't be a uniqueness clause, I would think.
If the words that designate an object have to pick out something unique, does that mean the words 'the cat' cannot designate an object (since they are not specified enough)? If they don't designate an object, then what is their logical status?
I am puzzled about questions that ask if a Creator can create Itself.
Look at a circle after it is drawn: at that point, it has no beginning and no end.
Look at a circle while it is being drawn: during its construction, you can see it does have a temporary beginning. Only after construction is complete, does its beginning seems to disappear.
If time is cyclical, then why couldn't a similar analogy apply?
Maybe I'm not expressing myself as clearly as I could, I hope someone here can upgrade the quality of my observation to get at its essence and not be stuck with the poor quality of my language choices.
When we explains darkness to a blind, he will fail to recognize it even If he is experiencing it.
May be contrasts and differences in sensations are the basic things in understanding a sensation and applying consciousness to it.
If we are hearing the same sound since our birth we will fail to apply consciousness to it.
What do you think about it philosophers?
I'm too young forgive me if its fallacious.
It is often said that biology, chemistry and other high-level sciences cannot be reduced to physics, e.g. laws governing evolution are irreducible to anything on offer in physics. On the other hand one often reads in descriptions of what a deterministic world would look like something akin to this:
If one has a complete description (of every particle) of the universe at time t and knows all the physical laws that govern it, then one could at least in principle deduce the state of affairs obtaining at another time t2, where t2 could either be a future or past point in time.
Since causation is a debated concept, I take it that that the main aim of scientific theories is prediction rather that (causal) explanation. But how can we reconcile the fact (?) that higher-level sciences cannot be reduced to physics and with this common description of determinism.
What is the ”I” who watches what the mind does?
When reading about philosophy of mind, I encounter expressions like ”I (or we) think”, ”I percieve”, ”I remember”, ”I see red”, ”I feel pain” etc. Isn´t it the mind that performs these actions, not the "I"? What is this ”I”? Is it some separate compartment of the mind, identical to the mind, or outside the mind? Should we modify Descartes and say: ”The mind thinks, therefore it is”?
In today's physics, the cutting edge theories require multiple spacial dimensions to work. Bosonic String Theory, for instance, requires 26 dimensions, while the five basic types of String Theory seem to need at least 11 dimensions. How can a person mentally visualize these extra spacial dimensions? Do they only exist as complex mathematical Calabi-Yau shapes, that only Hawking can imagine, or is there a more simple way a person can envision a sixth dimension, etc?