Philosophers have expressed wide ranging views on the infinite, and even distinguished different kinds of infinites. In terms of the 'infinite' standing for a sequence of events without end, then (just as there is no greatest possible number) it is difficult for someone to claim to have experienced that (experienced all numbers, none of which is lacking in a greater number), though not perhaps difficult for one to claim to understand it (that is, understanding that there is no greatest possible number) or for someone to have an experience of time or space, along with the feeling that this will never end. There has been some interesting testimony by some philosophers to have experienced soemthing related that may be of interest. Some philosophers have claimed to experience that which is boundless or, in some sense, eternal. Probably the two most famous philosophers to have spoken and analyzed such experiences are Boethius and Augustine. Boethius spoke of God's eternity (and having some...

Interesting! Philosophers have disagreed about the scope of our freedom and even over whether we (in non-addictive states) have freedom at all. Spinoza, for example, denied that we have libertarian freedom (the freedom to do other than what we are determined to do). The great majority of philosophers have affirmed our morally responsible freedom (or voluntariness), however. Probably the two most famous cases of a "fake it, till you make it" involve Pascal and Descartes. Pascal thought there were good prudential reasons for living a life of religious devotion, a life that included a belief in God. He proposed that nonbelievers could cultivate a belief in God by practicing religious rites and acting as though they believed in God. Descartes undertook a radical skeptical inquiry but decided before doing so that he would act in the world in conformity with the prevailing customs no matter how far his skepticism took him. In a sense, he would "fake" or at least act as though he did not doubt the...

Without getting into the technicalities of philosophy of mind, I suggest that there is a general sense in which you give other people access to your mind any time you are honestly disclosive and expressive of your thoughts, feelings, desires. Films and books may be disclosive of the mind of the author / director, but they also may obscure and mask a person's inner thoughts. Actually, you might consider flipping around the question and ask whether it makes some sense to think of works of art having a mind of their own. Arguably, this is all a matter of metaphorical attributions, but in our experience of art works can't we sometimes pick up a mood or emotion (there is anger or passion or desire in that film / book / painting, for example). John Updike once remarked that he thought books should have at least one secret. Of course one may interpret that as Updike claiming that the author should perhaps not be completely disclosive of all aspects of the plot and characters. But what about considering...

Great question! Undoubtedly there is a neurological basis for conscious thinking and so there is a sense in which the brain plays a role in sustaining thinking and the brain definitely has a location, BUT it is not clear whether thoughts themselves are the sorts of things that can have location. Does the thought "New York City is not the capital of New York State" have a certain size or weight or mass or color? It would be odd to think so. But let's consider where thoughts go, not in terms of spatial location, but in relationship to our conscious minds. Some philosophers acknowledge that in addition to our conscious mental life there is the unconscious and the sub-conscious. The difference between these is not obvious, but in general the former is thought to be more difficult to retrieve or bring to the surface of full consciousness. Presumably you know many things or can be said to have lots of thoughts about subjects you are not consciously reflecting on now. This knowledge is sometimes...

GREAT question! Most philosophers today in the English speaking world are materialists of one sort or the other. And so, they would hold that (to use your terms) the brain contains the mind or the brain is the mind or the person is the body, and so on. Those who hold that the mind (again, to use your terms) extends beyond the brain may still be materialists. Lynne Baker, for example, contends that the person is composed of the body as a whole (not just the brain), but she is still a materialist, and not a dualist. As it happens, I adopt a very unpopular position: integrative dualism, the view that while the person and body are a functional unity, the person (or mind or self) is not identical to her body or a body part (the brain). Arguments over theses positions would take us deep into the philosophy of mind literature. For a defense of integrative dualism, keep your eyes open for The Soul Hypothesis, ed by Stewart Goetz and Mark Baker (London: Continuum Press, forthcoming).

Great question! Some philosophers have denied that they are. Norman Malcolm is probably the most famous for claiming dreams are not experiences. It has been jokingly said that, for Malcolm, dreams are simply lies we tell each other over breakfast. The problem is that if you are a materialist dreams seem to be hard to identify with physical processes: there is no color in the brain, for example, and yet subjects report rich visual experiences with color, shape, and dimension. Those who believe that there is more to persons than physical-chemical processes (like H.H. Price or G.E. Moore) treated dream experiences in a way that is akin to their recognition of sense-data or the visual field in ordinary life. Setting to one side the big questions of materialism versus dualism, I suggest it is difficult to deny the reality of dream experiences. Subjects (and this group includes me) report what we appear to experience when sleeping, and these appear to be richly detailed, colorful scenes in which...