In this context, it sounds as though "qua" is being used to mean "considered as." So, for example, qua sentient being (i.e., considered as a sentient being) you have particular rights, while qua adult citizen (i.e., considered as an adult citizen) you have those rights plus additional rights, such as the right to vote. I see no contradiction here.

I can't do better than to refer you to Section 4.1 of this SEP entry: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-epistemology. It even addresses the specific question "Why I think rather than I walk ?"

Interesting question! First, I should note that some philosophers object to the claim that the ordinary term "water" refers to the chemical kind H2O. See here and here . Just for simplicity, my answer will ignore their objections. Second, a point about form. Using italics for propositions, I think we should replace the proposition Water is H2O with the universally quantified proposition Whatever is water is H2O , because, as I see it, the first proposition is false in all those possible worlds in which water doesn't exist, whereas the second proposition is (vacuously) true even in such worlds. Likewise, as I see it, the proposition Pegasus is Pegasus is contingently false (there being, as a matter of contingent fact, no such thing as Pegasus), whereas Whatever is Pegasus is Pegasus is necessarily true. So, on this view, the law of identity has the form "Whatever is A is A." I'd say that the important difference between Whatever is water is H2O and Whatever is A is A isn't...

Speaking for my own response to Question 4636: I offered two quotations of Krauss from his online interview with Sam Harris (in which Harris gave Krauss ample space to clarify his positions) in order to show how advanced training in science doesn't guarantee even minimal competence in philosophy. All three clauses in the first quotation are stunningly false: First, modern science hasn't "changed completely our conception of the very words 'something' and 'nothing'"; arguably, science couldn't completely change our conception of those ordinary-language words. Krauss seems to think that science has somehow made the word 'something' synonymous with 'something material' and 'nothing' synonymous with 'nothing material', but if that were so then those two-word phrases would be pleonastic (i.e., redundant), which clearly they're not. The set {2} contains nothing material, but it contains something; it's not the empty set. Second, the statement "Empirical discoveries continue to tell us that the...

Or even after a difficult day doing theoretical cosmology, to judge from what physicist Lawrence Krauss says about his new book, A Universe from Nothing , in an online interview with Sam Harris . Choice quotations: "Modern science...has changed completely our conception of the very words 'something' and 'nothing'. Empirical discoveries continue to tell us that the Universe is the way it is, whether we like it or not, and 'something' and 'nothing' are physical concepts and therefore are properly the domain of science, not theology or philosophy." "[D]o we have any physical reason to believe that such nothing was ever the case? Absolutely, because we are talking about our universe, and that doesn’t preclude our universe arising from precisely nothing , embedded in a perhaps infinite space , or infinite collection of spaces, or spaces-to-be" (my italics). Those assertions are so confused it's hard to know where to begin. Even fellow physicists have lambasted Krauss for talking...

Sorry to be a pest, but I still don't see how Hume escapes the problem. The claim that appeals to induction have natural force is itself an inductive claim: not a historical report of the force such appeals have had but a generalization about the force they continue to exert even on people the claimant has never met. So Hume seems to rely on the existence of a force when, by his own lights, he has no justification (not just ultimate but any justification) for believing that it exists. It looks as if Hume has to soften his critique of the justification of inductive beliefs or else stop arguing for the practical rationality of relying on induction.

If I may complicate things a bit: I don't question the scholarly accuracy of Prof. Baxter's reply on behalf of Hume, but I'd point out that he attributes to Hume a handful of inductive claims, for example: "We instinctively make and believe...predictions, anyway. We can't help it"; "People who rely on experience in this way tend to be happier and longer-lived than people who rely on other ways of coming to belief." Those are claims about human tendencies: not simply historical reports about how things have gone but inductive generalizations about how things (will) go under normal circumstances. If they were merely historical reports, we'd expect them to use the past tense rather than the present tense ("make," "believe," "rely," "tend"). Since they're inductive claims, by Hume's own lights we have no good reason to believe them. So it would seem, on this reconstruction of it, that Hume's argument for the practical rationality of our relying on induction contains premises he thinks we have no...

I don't think you're under any obligation to believe either side in this dispute, but if you do end up believing one side, presumably it will be the side whose reasons strike you as on balance the most persuasive. The book described here looks to be a careful discussion of the arguments of Aquinas and others. You might start there.

I share your skepticism about Heidegger and his work. But, to give him a fair shake, I'd recommend reading the long and detailed SEP entry on him, available at this link . It appeared in the SEP in 2011, which is surprisingly late given Heidegger's fame and influence. (By comparison, Derrida's entry appeared in 2006, Rorty's in 2001.) Anyway, the job of the entry-writer is not only to explicate the philosopher's major ideas but also to make a case for the interest and importance of those ideas. If, after reading the entry, you're not satisfied by the explication and persuaded that the ideas are interesting and important, then I'd recommend moving on to something else in philosophy. There's plenty of good stuff to be found elsewhere.

I can't help you with the Greek texts. But I'd encourage you to indulge in the heresy of questioning 'the fundamental equality of human kind'. What does it mean? That every member of Homo sapiens inherently possesses the same worth, the same dignity, the same value, or the same natural rights simply in virtue of belonging our species? I don't think that claim stands up to scrutiny. Species membership, as such, can't have moral significance. Nor does the claim look more plausible if we assume that God made every member of our species 'in his own image'.

I prefer to think of it as Hume's claim rather than Hume's discovery, since "discovery" implies the truth of what's discovered, and I think Hume was wrong, at least on what seems to me the most natural interpretation of what he says in the Treatise of Human Nature . But the interpretation is part of the problem; scholars disagree on what Hume meant. There's a magazine article on this topic, written by one of Hume's defenders, at this link . There's also a recent collection of essays, Hume on Is and Ought (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), that goes into minute detail on the interpretation and evaluation of Hume's claim.