Well, there are several distinct points here, so let's take them one by one. I don't pretend to be an expert on those guys, but I have looked at them a little bit, and the impression I have is that, yes, they are philosophically rather naive. Indeed, that's the very reason why I've never bothered to study them in depth: because, compared to the works of more erudite and sophisticated philosophers, I tend to find their work a little dissatisfying. Being charitable, I suspect that part of this is down to the fact that they're deliberately writing for a popular audience, rather than an audience of trained philosophers, and consequently need to gloss over some of the more abstruse and nit-picking details. But such an explanation can only go so far. I think it's reasonable to suppose that many of them are simply unaware that some of these arguments -- both the theistic arguments that they're criticising, and the atheistic or agnostic arguments that they're supporting -- can be developed in much...

Before I tackle your question head on, let me begin with an analogy: science. The number of philosophers who specialise in science is very small indeed. I'm not going to say that such people are non-existent: but, off-hand, I can't think of any. There are, however, quite a lot of philosophers who specialise in the philosophy of science. They ask very different questions from the scientists themselves, and they seek to answer them in very different ways. A scientist will seek to discover certain laws of nature that could explain how, as it might be, electrons cause certain observable effects to arise under certain conditions. But a philosopher of science will seek to analyse the very concept of a law of nature as such, or the nature of causation itself, or to describe what it actually means to explain something. Indeed, a philosopher of science might even question whether any amount of empirical data could ever justify us in regarding a scientist's claims about electrons as being literally true at...

I'm with Thomas Pogge on what the real issue is here. For what it's worth, I'm also no friend to the Ontological Argument. But let's see if a supporter of the argument might have something to say in response to this challenge... First of all, what form of the argument are we going to consider? It's been presented in many different ways over the centuries, and some versions have had much more force to them than others. In its simplest form, the argument basically goes as follows. God, by definition, possesses every perfection; existence is a perfection; therefore, God possesses it, i.e. God exists. But this version is notoriously vulnerable to objections like those that, for instance, Kant formulated way back in the eighteenth century. But there are other versions. One of the best (particularly associated with Leibniz, but formulated by several other people too, both before him and since) basically goes like this. (i) God, by definition, possesses every perfection; (ii) necessary existence...

As far as reasons for believing in either are concerned, I'd say they're on a par. But there is a difference: many more people believe in God. And they can't help it; and, if you try to talk them out of it, you're generally going to fail. If you belittle their beliefs with a comparison that they would regard as offensive, the only effect will be to upset or aggravate them: and, other things being equal, that's not to be recommended.

The charge of atheism was levelled against countless philosophers over the centuries: but, historically, it usually signified nothing more than a criticism of the established state religion and/or a heretical view on the nature of God/gods, and not a flat denial that there was any existent being answering to that name at all. For instance, among ancient philosophers, Epicurus and the other classical atomists were widely regarded as atheistic: but they really weren't. They did postulate the existence of gods. It was just that their so-called gods were material beings, living serene lives off in outer space, who didn't create the universe or, frankly, do much of anything at all, and who had absolutely no interest in mundane affairs, and consequently weren't fit objects for our religious devotion. Later on, Spinoza's contemporaries generally tended to regard him as an atheist, as did those of Hobbes, and Hume, not to mention Bruno, Vanini, Toland, and many others. But most of these figures ...

I don't know of any good reason to believe in God; and, judging by the fact that this question has gone unanswered for more than a week now, it would appear that my fellow panellists don't know of any either. I suppose a theist might say something like the following. Just look around you! Absolutely everything you experience constitutes evidence for the existence of God. The fact that anything exists at all entails that there must have been a creator. The fact that things display such a precise adaptation and organisation entails that this creator must have been an intelligent designer. 'Inference to the best explanation' is a standard mode of argument that is adopted throughout science and other domains, and this would be presented as just another instance of that kind of inference. The data in this case is the evidence our experience provides us of the way the world is; the conclusion is that a certain kind of God exists; and the argumentative move between the two relies on the principle that, of...

One little historical point to begin with: Descartes didn't actually appeal to the Argument from Design at all. But you're certainly right that it has a long and venerable history behind it. It's the fifth of St Thomas Aquinas's 'Five Ways' of proving the existence of God; and, in some form or other, it goes a long way still further back than that. Regarding the recent controversies (and perhaps explaining the 'oddness' of the trial), there are two issues that need to be distinguished. (i) Is it a good argument? (ii) Is it a scientific argument? The two questions are independent: both scientific debates and debates of other kinds (philosophical, theological, etc.) do get their fair share of both good arguments and bad arguments. We hope that, whatever the debate, the good arguments will win the day: but the bad ones deserve to be given a fair hearing too, so that what is bad about them might be exposed. Now, the recent controversies have centred around the question of whether or not ID is a...

The Ontological Argument, in its simplest form, runs as follows: God, by definition, is infinitely perfect in every respect. One respect in which something can be perfect is by existing -- it's better to exist than not to exist -- therefore God must possess this perfection alongside all the others (omnipotence, omniscience, etc.). If God lacked existence, He would thereby qualify as imperfect, but that would contradict the definition of what we mean by 'God'. Now, Kant makes a number of points about this argument: but, at the heart of his critique, his main objection is that it's wrong to think of existence as a perfection comparable to those others. The point is sometimes expressed by saying that the term "exists" is not a predicate: its logical role in sentences and thoughts is very different from that of genuine predicates like "is omnipotent" or "is omniscient". Existence is not a quality that we ascribe to a subject, as we might ascribe omnipotence to it. It is something prior to all such...

We need to distinguish between a posteriori and a priori arguments. Empirical sciences such as physics, chemistry and biology are predominantly supported by a posteriori evidence, grounded in experience. By contrast, the 'exact sciences' like mathematics are predominantly supported by a priori demonstration, grounded in the pure intuitions of the intellect alone. Mathematics cannot be based on experience, it might be said, because experience can only ever reveal contingent truths, whereas mathematical speculation gives us an insight into necessity. But both a priori and a posteriori knowledge can jointly be distinguished from faith, which for present purposes we might as well just define as any other basis for belief that cannot be fitted into either of these categories (e.g. the authority of a respected individual or of a text regarded as sacred, or a private inspiration supposedly delivered only to the elect). Now, there have been many philosophers and theologians over the...

I'd certainly agree that the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion ought to be the starting point. I sha'n't try to summarise Hume's arguments here, for he could surely express them far better than I could myself: the full text is freely available online, with only the most elementary of searches. In my opinion, this book constitutes one of the most powerful philosophical polemics ever written on any issue at all, and it really does need to be read by everyone who has any interest in the issue of intelligent design, both those who support it and those who oppose it. And yet my impression is that pitifully few on either side have ever really looked at it at all. The proponents of intelligent design so often portray Darwin as the great enemy, to be refuted at all costs; but, equally, its opponents portray Darwin as the prime source of salvation against what they regard as creationist mumbo-jumbo. But Darwin's work only ever touched on a tiny aspect of the universe, namely the living organisms...