Plato has a number of things to say about moderation in the Republic, but I think the most important one is where he associates moderation with the proper functioning of the appetitive part of the soul. The good news about that part is that it is responsible for the basic functions that keep us alive, such as eating and drinking, and also make us inclined to reproduce. The bad news is that the appetites have a tendency to excess, which--if not prevented by the ruling part of the soul (the reasoning part)--will lead us to do things that are not all things considered really good for us. Hence, moderation in a person will be the result of the "agreement" on the part of the appetitive part to the rule of the reasoning part. The same goes in a city: left to themselves, the craftsmen will have a tendency to excess and dissolution, but when ruled by Plato's philosopher-rulers, the proper functioning of this "appetitive" class of people will allow the whole state to become moderate. Unless and until they...

Aristotle is usually classified as a "classical republican," which is more misleading than helpful, given contemporary American political party names. A "classical republican" is typically contrasted with a "classical liberal," which only makes matters worse, given contemporary political (ab)uses of the "L-word." So here is a quick-and-dirty (read: not entirely adequate) brief account of what these terms are supposed to mean. A classical liberal is one who tends to think in terms of maintaining limits on the government's power to interfere in individual people's liberties. (A term related here that is also important in contemporary rhetoric is "libertarian.") Classical republicans tend to think in terms of what would make the best and most effective (or most admirable or choiceworthy) constitution, such that the entire welfare of the community is the primary consideration. Anyway, for better than a quick-and-dirty, look up these terms in the Stanford Dictionary of Philosophy (see the lower...

I assume there will be non-academic thinkers who are regarded by future generations (or even by others in the current generation) as great philosophers by some. As Aristotle said long ago, honor depends on those who bestow it, and so if enough people think that someone's blog or whatever is loaded with "great philosophy" then so be it. Moreover, I see no reason to think that even some groups of academics will find some the writings (or bloggings) of some non-academic worthy of the title, "great philosophy." But I also think that we may be talking past one another here. For there are certain fields of philosophy that have become extremely technical, and I regard it as very unlikely that anyone who is not academically trained in these areas will be able to provide important advances in such areas. But of course, there might still come to be some self-taught genius who does just that. So who knows? I suppose one thing that would be worth thinking more about would be what characteristics make...

I think the only really honest answer to your question is that Plato is never quite as clear about this issue as we wish he were. On the one hand, as you say, there seems to be no obvious limit on how many Forms a given particular might participate in--after all, something can be not just a good image of F-ness, but also a bad image (and hence participant in) G-ness. But maybe it helps that nothing in the theory of Forms (such as it is as a "theory," as opposed to something more like a hypothesis) allows participation that would create category mistakes (e.g. "The lion sleeps greenly" or "Putting the number 2 on a diet"), so there is presumably some limit on how many Forms can apply to a given thing. Anyway (back to the really honest answer), your question shows one of many reasons why few today find the "theory of Forms" adequate as a metaphysical theory.

Aristotle raises this issue in On Interpretation 9, but simply assumes that we have free will. The ancient Stoics believed that the only freedom of will that we have is the freedom to assent or dissent from the way things actually are. In other words, we have no free will over how things actually happen in the world. I believe (subject to correction!) that these were the first philosophersto address the question of free will directly.

The Forms make their first appearance in Book V, and are also significantly represented in the metaphysics of the Divided Line passage in Book VI. I agree, however, that they also appear in the theory of higher education Plato discusses in Book VII. I can't speak to how Plato's theory of Forms is taught, because I suspect that it is taught very differently by different teachers. But there are very good scholarly works on Plato's Forms. I recommend Richard Patterson's Image and Reality in Plato's Metaphysics (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1985). I also think a good review is provided in Henry Teloh's The Development of Plato's Metaphysics (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1981), Chapter 3.

Kant emphasized what he called the "categorical imperative," for which he gave two formulations. The formulation that seems most plainly to apply here is that we should be able to universalize into a maxim whatever decision we make in individual moral decisions. In this case, the question is whether we would be willing to universalize into a maxim that the policy of the military sshould be "don't ask, don't tell" for anyone of any gender and any sexuality. But it seems that we do not have such a policy for heterosexuals, and as far as I can tell, no one would think that such a policy would sensibly apply to heterosexuals. So it sseems we cannot universalize this policy, in which case the policy looks, on Kantian grounds, to be prejudicial.

Socrates said that "the unexamined life is not worth living for a human being" (Plato, Apology 38a) and plainly applied that maxim in questioning everyone he encountered, often those in positions of authority (see Plato, Apology 21b-e). As far as I know, he never expicitly said "question authority," but as I say, he certainly lived as if this was one of his beliefs.

I am not a Hegel scholar, but my colleague, who is one, recommends: Tom Rockmore, Before & After Hegel: A Historical Introduction to Hegel's Thought (University of California Press, 1993), and Frederick Beiser, Hegel (Routledge, 2005) Happy hunting!

The question you pose continues to be debated by Socrates/Plato scholars, so you should probably regard the answer I will give as a controversial one. On the one hand, as scholars who wish to resist the "authoritarian" reading of the Crito insist, Socrates clearly says that it is unjust to harm another, and that one who commits injustice actually harms himself most of all. But this can only serve to avoid the authoritarian reading if we beg the question of whether Socrates would believe that refusing to serve an unjust regime was what justice required. Here is something else we know about Socrates: He actually did serve--several times--in the Athenian army during the Pelopponesian War. On at least one of the campaigns we know he was a part of, Athens was attempting to kill all of the inhabitants of Potidaia. One might expect a moralist like Socrates to have some qualms about genocide! Socrates plainly recognizes that many things decided by the Athenians--including in particular...